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Introduction
In decision making under uncertainty, a decision maker's attitude toward risk may have a major impact upon decisions and hence upon expected monetary payoffs. For example, a risk avoider may find it optimal to choose a more or less conservative decision instead of a riskier decision offering a higher expected payoff. A decision maker's attitude toward risk can be represented formally in terms of utility, and a nonlinear utility function for monetary payoffs indicates that the decision maker is not everywhere risk-neutral.
The impact of nonlinear utility in noncompetitive decision-making situations (i.e., decisions against nature) has been studied extensively, both in the statistical decision theory literature (e.g., Pratt [5] ) and in specific areas of application (e.g., Markowitz [4] and other work on portfolio analysis). In competitive decision-making situations (i.e., decision-making situations where some or all of the uncertainty concerns actions to be chosen by one or more competing decision makers), however, payoffs are generally assumed to be expressed in terms of utilities or utility functions are assumed to be linear. The actual conversion from monetary payoffs to utilities is thus "swept under the rug," so to speak.1 The primary question of interest in this paper, then, is as follows: Given a competitive situation in which the consequences to the competitors can be expressed entirely in monetary terms, what are the effects of the utility functions of the competitors on (a) the strategies of the competitors and (b) the expected monetary value of the situation for each competitor?
The specific situation studied here is the case in which there are two competitors with two actions available to each competitor and in which the monetary payoff to a competitor is the negative of the monetary payoff to the competitor's opponent. In the terminology of game theory, we are working with a two-person, zero-sum (in money) game. The advantages of investigating this situation are that it is easier to deal with than more complicated situations (e.g., games with more strategies for each player, non-zero-sum games, multi-person games) and that the solution concepts are less controversial than in more complicated situations. It seems to be a logical place to initiate the study of the effect of nonlinear utility on strategies and expected payoffs in competitive situations.
The monetary payoffs and the utility functions are assumed to be known to both competitors, so that the only uncertainty facing each decision maker concerns the opponent's choice of an action. With respect to the nonlinear utility functions, it is assumed that these utility functions are exponential in form. This implies constant risk aversion in the sense that the Pratt-Arrow measure of risk aversion (Pratt [5] ) is not a function of wealth. Therefore, the initial wealth levels of the competitors are not relevant factors.
In ?2, zero-sum games with and without dominant pure strategies are discussed and the details of the game studied in this paper are presented. The effects of nonlinear utility on the optimal strategies and resulting expected payoffs are then studied in ??3 and 4. ?3 involves combinations of utility functions that preserve the zero-sum nature of the game, while ?4 involves combinations of utility functions that do not preserve the zero-sum condition. The results and their implications are briefly summarized in ?5.
Zero-Sum Games with and without Dominant Pure Strategies
It is important to distinguish between games possessing dominant strategies for one or both players and games not possessing such strategies. Even if only one player has a dominant pure strategy, the existence of such a strategy leads the other player to use a pure strategy. The reason for our concern with the existence of dominant pure strategies is that if the players use pure strategies, the introduction of nonlinear utility functions will not alter these strategies as long as the utility functions are increasing functions of money, as is virtually always assumed. In the absence of dominant strategies, the only equilibrium point in a two-by-two, two-person, zero-sum game is an equilibrium point in mixed strategies.
For the purposes of this paper, then, the case of interest is that in which there are no dominant pure strategies. By suitably labeling players and actions, we can express all such two-by-two, two-person, zero-sum games in the form represented in Table 1 
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The game in Table 1 The Pratt-Arrow measure of risk aversion is equal to b in both instances. Exponential utility is convenient to work with because the risk aversion is not a function of wealth, and some view exponential utility as a reasonable approximation to the preferences of many decision makers (e.g., Howard [3] , Savage [7] ). In this section we consider cases in which
where UI and Ull represent the utility functions for Players I and II, respectively. Within the exponential family of utility functions, this implies that bi = -bll, where bi and bl1 are the parameters of the players' respective utility functions. Thus, if one player is a risk taker, the other is a risk avoider, and the "degree" of risk aversion for the latter is equal to the "degree" of risk taking for the former. This case is quite restrictive but is of interest because it preserves the zero-sum nature of the game. When the game is expressed in utilities, the relative sizes of the four values in Table 1 change because Ul(x) replaces x for x E { A, B, C, D }, but the game is still zero-sum.
Furthermore, the players realize this, since we assume that both utility functions are known to both players. 
Utility Functions that do not Preserve the Zero-Sum Condition
In this section, we continue to assume that both players have exponential utility functions, but we relax the restriction given in (3. The relaxation of the zero-sum condition means that although the game is zero-sum in terms of payoffs, it is not zero-sum in terms of utilities. In non-zero-sum games, the notion of an "optimal" strategy becomes somewhat vague and debatable. Equilibrium strategies do not seem as compelling as in the zero-sum case; for example, they are not necessarily Pareto optimal or minimax.3 Nevertheless, because the non-zero-sum game in utilities is generated by a zero-sum game in payoffs, the relationship between the two players is still essentially an adversary relationship, and we assume no communication between the players. Moreover, in many cases the equilibrium strategies may be "close" to the set of Pareto-optimal strategies. In any event, equilibrium strategies retain the property that once the players reach such strategies, they have no incentive to move away from them. Since no enforceable agreements can be made in a noncooperative game, the only type of stable outcome is one that is self-enforcing in the sense that each player's strategy is a best response to the other players' strategies, in which case the players' strategies form an equilibrium point. In the following analysis, we will concentrate on equilibrium strategies, but we will also attempt to show the relationship between such strategies and the Pareto-optimal set.
To simplify matters, we first assume that the two players have identical utility functions. In the literature involving attitude toward risk, the most commonly encountered assumption is that of risk aversion on the part of decision makers. Thus, the situation in which both players are risk avoiders should be of particular interest. If we let b = b, = b11 > 0, the utility table for the game is as given in Table 2 , where the first number in each cell is Player I's utility and the second number is Player II's utility. From (4.1) and (4.2), the equilibrium strategies are identical to those in (3.4) and (3.7), respectively. utility table for this situation is given in Table 3 , and the equilibrium strategies are, from (4.1) and (4.2), identical to those in (3.6) and (3.5), respectively. The behavior of p and q is similar to the situations discussed in ?3, so we will not repeat that discussion. between (B, -B) and (D, -D) . Moreover, it is easy to show that the optimal (equilibrium point) strategy must lie between (C, -C) and (A, -A) . Finally, note that every combination of mixed strategies is Pareto optimal, which seems reasonable since an increase in one player's expected payoff implies a decrease in the other player's expected payoff. If the utility functions are nonlinear but the zero-sum condition is preserved (the case considered in ?3), the pure-strategy combinations still lie on a straight line, as in Figure 4 . If the zero-sum condition is not preserved, however, these points are no longer collinear. Figures 5 and 6 illustrate cases in which the players are both risk avoiders and both risk takers, respectively. In Figure 5 (A = 10, B = 1, C = 2, D = 15 , and b = bi= = 0.1), the set of (EUI, EUII) points that can be attained without coordination of strategies is shown, and the equilibrium point, denoted by e, is not Pareto optimal. In Figure 6 (A = 10, B = 1, C = 2, D = 15, and b -bi  -b11  = 0.1), the line joining (U1(B), UII(-B)) and (U1(D), UII(-D)) is the Pareto-optimal set, and the equilibrium point is once again not Pareto optimal. When the utility functions of the players do not preserve the zero-sum nature of the game, it may be possible for both of the players to increase their expected utilities simultaneously through cooperation. Of course, the potential improvement depends on how close the equilibrium solution is to the Pareto-optimal set. As noted earlier, the relationship between the two players is still essentially an adversary relationship. 
Summary
The effects of the nonlinear utility functions on the strategies and hence on the expected monetary payoffs in the cases studied here are difficult to interpret. When one player is a risk taker and the other a risk avoider, as in ?3, the risk taker is usually better off (and the risk avoider is thereby usually worse off) in terms of expected monetary payoff than he is under risk neutrality on the part of both competitors. However, under certain circumstances (small risk-aversion coefficients and particular relationships among the payoffs), the reverse is true-the risk avoider's lot improves and the risk taker's lot worsens.
Even if the nonlinear utility functions of the two players are identical, as in ?4, the strategies and expected payoffs change as the utility functions change together. For
In the finance area, for example, the voluminous literature in the past two decades on portfolio analysis models, an early example of which is Markowitz [4] , and the widespread application of such models (e.g., mean-variance analysis) are based on the assumption that investors are risk avoiders. example, as both players become risk averse (or risk taking) in an identical fashion, the expected payoff may increase for one and decrease for the other. In general, the effects of nonlinear utility functions on a player's strategy and expected monetary payoff depend on the player's utility function, the opponent's utility function, and the relationships among the entries in the payoff table for the game. Furthermore, it does not appear possible to express this dependence in the form of simple rules of thumb, although the results in ??3 and 4 indicate the direction of movement of strategies and expected payoffs as the inputs to the problem are varied in certain systematic ways.
As might be expected, results from noncompetitive decision making do not necessarily carry over into competitive situations. In a noncompetitive situation, a decision maker's probabilities fo: uncertain events should be independent of utility considerations. Thus, a decision maker can never be better off (and may be worse off) in terms of expected monetary payoff with a nonlinear utility function for money than with a linear utility function. In the competitive situation considered in this paper, on the other hand, an increase in the risk aversion of a decision maker may cause altered strategies by a competitor, and as a result the decision maker may actually be better off in terms of expected monetary payoff. Of course, we have assumed that a decision maker's assessment of probabilities for an opponent's actions would always equal the opponent's equilibrium strategy, which could be affected by utility considerations. If a decision maker has reason to believe that an opponent will deviate from the equilibrium strategy, probabilities should be adjusted accordingly. At any rate, in simple zero-sum games, ths effect of nonlinear utility on a decision maker's strategy and expected monetary payoff will generally be different from the same effect in a noncompetitive decision-making situation.
It is important to emphasize the fact that the results in this paper are descriptive in nature. To use them in a normative fashion, as illustrated by the suggestion that a player should change his utility function to improve his expected payoff, is, of course, inappropriate. An individual's utility function represents his relative preferences for different consequences (for different amounts of money in this case), and he cannot change those preferences to fit the problem any more than he can change a probability of an event from 0.6 to 0.1 in a game against nature just because the lower probability yields a higher expected payoff. 
